F.U.B.A.R.

Exactly five years ago, the US invasion of Iraq began with an overwhelming air assault, “Shock and Awe,” intended to minimize civilian casualties and Iraqi military resistance. The strategy was both humane and effective, unlike nearly all that has followed. (Previous posts here at Newsprism have addressed the lessons we can learn from the war and its astronomical economic, political, and humanitarian costs.)

The War has predictably become a central focus of the presidential campaign, with both Democratic contenders promising to draw our troops down substantially and in short order, and the Republican nominee calling for an open-ended committment that could last decades. Neither approach is tenable, the one risking a bloodbath on the order of the Cambodian “killing fields,” the other risking a slow bleed of American lives, treasure, and stature. Meanwhile, the media obsess on trivial gaffes that suggest Barack Obama doesn’t know about al Qaeda in Iraq, or John McCain doesn’t know that Iran is predominantly Shiite.

In the midst of these political calculations and media molehills, more sober and non-partisan voices should be heard.

In an interview with the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations, Daniel Serwer, the Executive Director of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, believes that a drawdown is inevitable—we simply can’t sustain the current force. Serwer believes that our next president will inherit a force of around 130,000, an improved but still unstable security situation, and a slowly improving, fragile political situation. His hope is that nascent glimmers of political compromise will take hold in time for provincial elections, and that a sense of Iraqi nationalism will ease the tensions between Shiites and Sunnis. Serwer, a career diplomat specializing in the resolution of ethnic and religious tension, is at best guardedly optimistic, though he sees a long slog towards an uncertain outcome ahead.

Dr. Frederick Kagan, a military historian working with the non-partisan American Enterprise Institute, argued forcefully for, and accurately predicted the success of, the Bush surge to secure Baghdad. He’s recommended that in order to consolidate that success, we must accept longer tours for our troops, more reconstruction funding to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure, a concerted national effort to recruit new soldiers, an expanded fighting force, and an aggressive push for unity between the warring Shiites and Sunnis. The bottom line for Kagan is American resolve; he calls for “a national commitment to victory in Iraq” and predicts that “failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.”

Neither Serwer nor Kagan can or would predict the outcome of attemps to reconcile the Shiite and Sunni factions that have in effect divvied up Baghdad and the nation through sectarian violence. Our efforts to this point have sought to facilitate reconciliation, which may or may not be possible. Even if these longstanding and bitter enemies could forge a governing coalition, establishing a democracy wouldn’t be a given. In fact, the best case scenario might be a divided Iraq along the lines of post-WWII Berlin, with neither side practicing anything approaching democracy.

The latest attempt at reconciliation is off to a bad start this week as both Shiite and Sunni factions are boycotting or walking out amid escalating sectarian violence.

In his speech at the Pentagon today, President Bush, seeemingly undaunted, continued to preach his gospel of freedom, democracy, and peace:

…we’re helping the people of Iraq establish a democracy in the heart of the Middle East. A free Iraq will fight terrorists instead of harboring them. A free Iraq will be an example for others of the power of liberty to change the societies and to displace despair with hope. By spreading the hope of liberty in the Middle East, we will help free societies take root — and when they do, freedom will yield the peace that we all desire.

Bush’s idealism flies in the face of the most prescient voice speaking on this war, Colin Powell’s. After removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1992, Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” which is currently published online in its entirety by the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations. In the piece, Powell explained why the first Bush administration chose not to invade and occupy Iraq, choosing instead a strategy of containment:

The Gulf War was a limited objective war. If it had not been, we would be ruling Baghdad today—at unpardonable expense in terms of money, lives lost and ruined regional relationships … Would it have been worth the inevitable follow up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time thought not.

The best minds in America only offer vague hopes that we can succeed in Iraq. The whole debacle could have and should have been avoided. Neither party has a credible plan to retreat with honor or to win.

That’s the true tragedy of this war: we can’t leave without losing our honor and committing a cowardly and immoral act, we can’t stay in sufficient numbers to achieve our stated objectives, and there’s no such thing as a reasonable compromise between the two courses.

The next president will inherit the worst strategic blunder in American history.

Newsprism